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REPORT OF THE CLEVELAND EXPERTS MEETING: THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION*
On September 2526, 2008, Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law hosted a symposium and experts meeting to help advance the 
project of defining aggression and arriving at an appropriate trigger me-
chanism for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to exercise jurisdiction 
over that crime. The event was in coordination with Christian Wenaweser, 
President-elect of the ICC Assembly of State Parties, and supported by 
funding from the Wolf Family Foundation, the Planethood Foundation, the 
Public International Law and Policy Group, and the Frederick K. Cox In-
ternational Law Center. This Report summarizes the presentations and dis-
cussions of the participants in the experts meeting.  
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INTRODUCTION
On September 2526, 2008, Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law hosted a symposium and experts meeting to help advance the 
project of defining aggression and arriving at an appropriate trigger me-
chanism for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to exercise jurisdiction 
over that crime. The event was in coordination with Christian Wenaweser, 
President-elect of the ICC Assembly of State Parties, and supported by 
funding from the Wolf Family Foundation, the Planethood Foundation, the 
Public International Law and Policy Group, and the Frederick K. Cox Inter-
national Law Center. 
The Cleveland Experts Meeting was chaired by David Scheffer, 
former U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues and head of the 
U.S. Delegation during the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference for the In-
ternational Criminal Court. The two dozen other participants in the Experts 
Meeting, several were a mix of delegates and NGO representatives who 
have participated in the work of the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression (Christian Wenaweser, Stefan Barriga, Roger Clark, Don Fe-
rencz, Robbie Manson).  Additional participants were former government, 
international organization, and NGO representatives who had taken part in 
the negotiations of the Rome Statute and/or its supplemental instruments 
(Cherif Bassiouni, Ben Ferencz, Henry King, Michael Newton, Elizabeth 
Wilmshurst). The remaining participants consisted of leading academic ex-
perts on the ICC and international criminal law practitioners from across the 
globe (Astrid Reisinger Coracini, Shahram Dana, Mark Drumbl, Mark Ellis, 
Elise Leclerc-Gagne, Larry May, Sean Murphy, Laura Olson, Keith Petty, 
Christopher Rassi, Leila Sadat, Bill Schabas, Michael Scharf, Ben Schiff, 
Oscar Solera, Noah Weisbord). The experts participated in their individu-
al/personal capacities, and not as representatives of their respective coun-
tries, organizations, or institutions. 
The hope was that by holding the session away from the United Na-
tions and involving a wide range of outside expertise and experience, the 
Experts Meeting could develop and explore new proposals for the Assembly 
of State Parties’ consideration. In an effort to place the proposals of the 
Cleveland Experts Meeting before the Special Working Group on the Crime 
of Aggression (SWGCA) in time for its November 2008 sessions, the Ex-
perts Meeting provided a brief preliminary report of their work without de-
lay, followed by this more comprehensive document that reflects the details 
of the discussion. The report follows the “Chatham House Rule;” therefore, 
with the exception of proponents of the two major proposals under consid-
eration, the views of particular experts remain unidentified in the text.  An-
nexed at the end of the Report is the “Cleveland Declaration.” All partici-
pants of the Experts Meeting endorsed the Cleveland Declaration, with the 
exception of government and international organization representatives who 
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by virtue of their official positions could not associate themselves with the 
document. 
DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
The first segment of the meeting focused on the definition of the 
crime of aggression. Although much progress has been made in defining the 
crime, a major area still in the working stages is how to incorporate excep-
tions, if at all. The question posed to the group was whether it could arrive 
at a definition that satisfactorily takes into account exceptions and how such 
a definition would look. Potential exceptions posed for consideration in-
cluded: self-defense, humanitarian intervention, protection of nationals, 
rescue from embassies under siege, antiterrorism efforts, and nuclear non-
proliferation. Humanitarian intervention and self-defense received notable 
emphasis. Some experts questioned the possibility of agreeing on what 
would constitute an acceptable form of humanitarian intervention or self-
defense before either could be incorporated as an exception to the crime of 
aggression.
Initially, the group pointed out that by its very nature, aggression is 
the most political of all international crimes, and the difficulty with defining 
it is not necessarily inherent within the complexity of the legal issues per-
taining to it, but with the political ramifications of what a legal definition 
may contain. Moreover, states are reluctant to reveal that they color their 
approaches to the definition with their respective political considerations 
and with their political relations with other states, particularly the major 
ones. This is why the question of defining aggression has, for all practical 
purposes, continued since the Nuremburg charter’s inclusion of “crimes 
against peace.” The work of the various committees since 1946 up to the 
1974 GA Resolution on defining aggression clearly evidences the use of 
legal technicalities to mask the politics.  From 1995 to the present, the issue 
is much less the definition as it is a triggering mechanism. 
Security Council Trigger
The experts noted that lawful exceptions to the use of force could 
be linked to an exclusive Security Council trigger which could allow the 
Security Council to take into account exceptions when determining aggres-
sion. Unless the Security Council has exclusive power to make determina-
tions on aggression, some experts felt the definition of aggression itself 
must incorporate the exceptions. 
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Possibility of Security Council Granting Approval through Resolution 
One expert explained that with the 1974 General Assembly Resolu-
tion 3314 definition,1 the drafters wrote in exculpating clauses to meet the 
concerns of various groups who did not want the restriction of a specific 
definition.  The language used in the clauses was intentionally open to in-
terpretation, leaving the Security Council with the discretion to determine 
aggression.
The current definition of aggression, then, may be able to accom-
modate proposed exceptions.  One of those ways, as suggested by a delega-
tion in the last Assembly of State Parties Special Working Group Meeting, 
would be to have the Security Council draft a resolution, after-the-fact, 
sanctioning the use of force by the state. If Article 2 of GA Resolution 
33142 were absent in the definition, this possibility would always be left 
open. Although an after-the-fact Security Council resolution would not be 
determinative for the ICC, the Court would likely give due deference to 
such a resolution because of the Security Council’s political influence.  
1 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 1, 4-8, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974). (“Article 1 - 
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter 
of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.  Explanatory Note: In this Definition the 
term “State”: (a) Is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is 
a member of the United Nations; (b) Includes the concept of a “group of States” where ap-
propriate. Article 4 - The acts enumerated above ar enot exhaustive and the Security Council 
may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter.  
Article 5 - 1. No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or 
othewise, may serve as a justification for aggression.  2. A war of aggression is a crime 
against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international responsibility. Article 6 - 
Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way enlarging or diminishing the 
scope of the Charter, including its provision concernin cases in which the use of force is 
lawful. Article 7 - Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way 
prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the 
Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Cahrter of the United Nations, particular peoples under colonial 
and racist régimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to 
struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the 
Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration. Article 8 - In their 
interpretation and application the above provisions are interrelated and each provision should 
be construed in the context of the other provisions.”).
2 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 1, art. 2. (“The first use of armed force by a State in 
contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression 
although the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determi-
nation that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of 
other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences 
are not of sufficient gravity.”). 
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Another expert suggested that the ICC should not defer to any after-
the-fact determination by the Security Council when looking at the facts and 
evidence within the context of the adjudication process. Multiple members 
questioned whether defendants could challenge the Security Council’s de-
termination on the aggression if it is merely a trigger to jurisdiction.   
Some felt that after receiving the Security Council’s determination 
of aggression, the prosecutor could move forward with the case but would 
still retain the burden of proving the scope and elements of the crime and 
the criminal responsibility.  
Magnitude and General Assembly Resolution 3314  
The experts noted that there is an ongoing debate concerning the 
use of a magnitude threshold before deeming an act as a crime of aggres-
sion. One approach is to use the list of acts that constitute aggression con-
tained in Article 3 of GA Resolution 33143 without applying any magnitude 
test.  Other experts advocated an approach to keep the magnitude test and 
then look to Resolution 33144 once an act meets the magnitude test. Some 
experts voiced concern that a magnitude test itself may not be accurate in 
determining acts of aggression.  
Inclusion of Threats 
The experts noted that one could view the language of proposed Ar-
ticle 8 bis5 as covering all of the exceptions for acts involving the actual use 
3 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 1, art. 3. (“Article 3 - Any of the following acts, 
regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of 
article 2, qualify as aggression: (a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of 
the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from 
such invasion or attached, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another 
State or part thereof; (b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of 
another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State; (c) 
The blockade of the ports or casts of a State by the armed forces of another State; (d) An 
attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of 
another State; (e) The use of armed forces of one Sate which are within the territory of 
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions 
provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the 
termination of the agreement; (f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has 
placed at the dispoal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of 
aggression against a third State; (g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, 
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State 
of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above or its substantial involvement therein.”).  
4 Id.
5 Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Discussion Paper on the Crime of Aggression Proposed by 
the Chairman, ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/2 (2 June 2008), Article 8 bis [hereinafter Article 8 bis], 
available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/2AE911B2-15AA-4276-8F23-5D6818907 
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of armed force but as not covering threats of acts of aggression. This is dif-
ferent than Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter,6 which prohibits both threats 
and actual use of force.  In paragraph 2 of Article 8 bis,7 the phrase “use of 
armed force” eliminates the notion of including threats, but one could view 
the latter phrase “any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations” as permitting the inclusion of threats. 
Generally, the group voiced agreement that the definition of aggres-
sion should not include threats nor was it intended to include threats.  Some 
participants suggested that other crimes and other venues cover threats of 
aggression. The ICC would not have jurisdiction over such threats, and the 
language of Article 8 bis8 appears clear to this end. As a conceptual view-
point for why threats may be left out, the experts suggested that threats do 
not cross the gravity threshold.
007/146570/ICCASP6SWGCA2English1.pdf. (“ 1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of 
aggression” means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an 
act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations.2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” 
means the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accor-
dance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 
1974, qualify as an act of aggression: (a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a 
State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, result-
ing from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of 
another State or part thereof; (b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the 
territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another 
State; (c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another 
State;(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and 
air fleets of another State; (e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the 
territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the 
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory 
beyond the termination of the agreement; (f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, 
which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpe-
trating an act of aggression against a third State; (g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of 
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involve-
ment therein.”).
6 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
7 Article 8 bis, supra note 5 at 2. 
8 See id.
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Priority and Intent 
The experts noted that two competing ideas, priority and intent, 
were incorporated into Articles 1, 2 and 3 of GA Resolution 3314 of 1974.9
One idea, advanced by the Russians in 1973,10 was that priority was the 
determining factor of aggression. In other words, “first use of armed force” 
constitutes prima facie evidence of an act of aggression. The second idea, 
taken from western law,11 focused on intent as the most significant factor in 
determining an act of aggression. In other words, it would necessary to de-
termine if the intent was legitimate, such as self-defense, or rather a pretext 
for territorial expansion. The use or non-use of Article 212 may therefore 
affect the compromise language by incorporating both the concepts of prior-
ity and intent. Removal of Article 213 may result in the removal of the idea 
of priority, making room for the exceptions. 
Providing background, one expert explained how a 1969 proposal 
for the definition of aggression14 made specific reference to intent.  In the 
end, the drafters did not include it because they felt the Security Council 
was able to make a final determination weighing all appropriate factors in-
cluding intent. 
Another speaker mentioned that the German proposal reiterated the 
same discussion.15 The German proposal originally used the element of in-
tent as the only way to determine which uses of force actually constitute 
aggression.
Another expert stated that intent would indeed be helpful in identi-
fying which uses of force to exclude, whereas elements such as magnitude 
may not be helpful in that regard; however, problems may arise in defining 
a specific intent. Since accurately identifying the object of intent is some-
times problematic, the experts did not pursue the German proposal16 which 
included intent as the mens rea requirement.  Ultimately, without an agree-
9 See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 1, arts. 1-3. 
10 GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/8419 at p. 21. 
11 The reports of the Special Committee are contained in GAOR, 23rd Sess., Agenda Item 
86, A/7185/Rev. 1; GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 20 (A/7620), Feb. 14, 1970; GAOR, 25th 
Sess., Supp No 19 (A/8019), July 13-Aug. 14, 1970; GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 19 
(A/8419), Feb. 1-Mar. 5, 1971; GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 19 (A/8719), Jan. 31-Mar. 3, 
1972.
12 See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 1, art. 2. 
13 Id.
14 See supra note 11. 
15 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Court, Dec.1-12, 1997, 
Working Group on Definitions and Elements of Crime, Proposed by Germany, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/DP.20 (Dec. 11, 1997). 
16 Id. 
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ment regarding specific intent, there must be an agreement on exceptions, 
unless the group decided not to consider exceptions at all. 
Another expert argued that because defining the exceptions and fur-
ther agreeing on those definitions may be so difficult, one route for includ-
ing grounds for the exclusion of responsibility may be to work mens rea
requirements, even intent and knowledge, into the definition. 
Elements 
As an alternative to listing specific exceptions or defenses in the 
statute, or providing that the Security Council must adopt a resolution sanc-
tioning the use of force, another option is to outline the elements for aggres-
sion and include them within the statute. Although enumerated and codified 
elements for other crimes fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction, outlining the 
elements for aggression would be more difficult.   
One expert reasoned that defining the elements includes addressing 
the barrier between state actions and policies with regard to the decision to 
engage in the use of force. The same is true regarding the specific elements 
of criminal responsibility. The elements must address the actus reus of the 
individual. 
One speaker stated that the general attitude of the group seemed to 
suggest that one problem with the definition of aggression is a lack of speci-
ficity. Remedying the lack of specificity may require, at a minimum, further 
development of the elements of the crimes.  In doing so, drafters would 
need to ensure that the definition addresses all possible uses of force that 
would be consistent with the U.N. Charter. 
Concurring, another expert referenced Article 22 of the Rome Sta-
tute,17 which requires that judges apply a narrow definition of the crime 
under the Statute.  Therefore, greater specificity is crucial because an ambi-
guous provision would give rise to a greater presumption that the use of 
force is lawful. 
With regard to the timing of the establishment of the elements, one 
expert felt that despite the importance of the elements, drafting them before 
the review conference was unlikely.  It would be ideal, another suggested, to 
have the elements as a package together with everything else at the review 
17 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art 22, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjourna 
l/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf. (“A person shall not be criminally responsible under this 
Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court.  2.  The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall 
not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour 
of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted. 3.  This article shall not affect the 
characterization of any conduct as criminal under international law independently of this 
Statute.
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conference.  Recognizing the difficulty of the task, this expert proposed that 
defining the elements might be a task to address with a greater sense of ur-
gency. 
Other experts agreed that despite the difficulty in drafting and at-
taining agreement on the elements, including these elements was important.  
In response to the difficulties, one expert suggested that at a minimum, add-
ing some of the key elements with respect to individual criminal responsi-
bility to the present definition could provide a general indication of what 
these elements should be.  
Applicability of Article 31 
The experts discussed the impact of Article 3118 on the crime of ag-
gression.  Article 3119 sets forth the general defenses available to the ac-
cused, such as mistake, intoxication, self-defense, and obedience to orders.  
One expert voiced concern about a general perception of the inapplicability 
18 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 31, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjourna 
l/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf. (“Grounds for excluding criminal responsibility- 1. In 
addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this Statute, a 
person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that person's conduct: (a) The 
person suffers from a mental disease or defect that destroys that person's capacity to appre-
ciate the unlawfulness or nature of his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her con-
duct to conform to the requirements of law; (b) The person is in a state of intoxication that 
destroys that person's capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his or her conduct, 
or capacity to control his or her conduct to conform to the requirements of law, unless the 
person has become voluntarily intoxicated under such circumstances that the person knew, or 
disregarded the risk, that, as a result of the intoxication, he or she was likely to engage in 
conduct constituting a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (c) The person acts reason-
ably to defend himself or herself or another person or, in the case of war crimes, property 
which is essential for the survival of the person or another person or property which is essen-
tial for accomplishing a military mission, against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a 
manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other person or property 
protected. The fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation conducted by forces 
shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under this subpa-
ragraph; (d) The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent death or of continuing 
or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another person, and the person acts 
necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that the person does not intend to 
cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided. Such a threat may either be: (i) Made 
by other persons; or (ii) Constituted by other circumstances beyond that person's control. 
2.The Court shall determine the applicability of the grounds for excluding criminal responsi-
bility provided for in this Statute to the case before it. 3. At trial, the Court may consider a 
ground for excluding criminal responsibility other than those referred to in paragraph 1 
where such a ground is derived from applicable law as set forth in article 21. The procedures 
relating to the consideration of such a ground shall be provided for in the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence.”). 
19 Id.
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of Article 3120 because the drafters only intended the enumerated defenses 
to apply to an individual whereas aggression is a crime of the State.  For 
example, an individual’s right of self-defense in terms of Article 3121 is not 
the same as a State’s right to self-defense under Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter.22  Some questioned why an accused would not be able to rely on 
the defenses under Article 31.23
Location of Defenses and Structure of the Statute 
The experts also questioned whether to locate the defenses to the 
crime of aggression within the general part of the statute or imbed them 
within the definition of the crime.  One expert proposed that the inclusion of 
enumerated defenses in the definition of aggression would make the statute 
more clear.   
One expert noted that the current definition of aggression does not 
include matters relating to Article 3124 or any defenses.  The expert sug-
gested that the definition of aggression should stand-alone with the addition 
of a sub-paragraph to Article 31.25  In addition, the expert noted that para-
graph 3 of Article 3126 allows the ICC to consider a ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility other than the grounds laid out in paragraph 1 of 
Article 31.27  Since this article would apply to the crime of aggression, it 
would be possible to enumerate defenses to aggression in a separate docu-
ment rather than require amendment of Article 3128 itself. 
Judicial Interpretation of the Definition 
Participants noted that many argue a detailed definition of aggres-
sion is necessary to give the defendant a fair trial.  Another expert argued 
that because the importance of the crime of aggression would lie entirely in 
its deterrent effect, it would be best to keep the definition vague, and permit 
judges to interpret it with reference to general international law. Most States 
employed this method to apply the Prohibition of Piracy for hundreds of 
years until the advent of the Law of the Sea Convention.29
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.  
23 Rome Statute, supra note 18. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id.
29 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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Another expert pointed out that there has been much work on defin-
ing the crimes, identifying exceptions, and looking at mens rea to make the 
statute into an effective means of prosecuting international crimes. Giving 
the judges the power to bring international law into the statute through judi-
cial interpretation would weaken the statute. In addition, it would be incon-
sistent with Article 22,30 which only allows the judges to interpret the penal 
provisions narrowly. 
DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION AND JURISDICTIONAL FILTER (THE SCHEFFER
PROPOSAL)
The experts considered, debated, and commented on a proposal for 
the definition of the Crime of Aggression and jurisdictional filter (Arts. 8bis 
and 15bis below) submitted by David Scheffer and a proposal for States to 
opt into the crime of aggression (amendment to Art. 12) submitted by Rob-
bie Manson. The two proposals are complementary and considering them 
together is a way of facilitating a more flexible standard for operationalizing 
the crime of aggression beyond the long-standing proposal that the Security 
Council must first determine that an act of aggression has occurred. As sub-
sequently revised based on the input of the Experts Meeting, the Scheffer 
proposal (which appears below) conforms to the framework of the 
SWGCA’s latest proposal.31  As such, the proposed definition of the crime 
of aggression would appear as new Article 8bis, and the proposed jurisdic-
tional filter would appear as new Article 15bis. 
The Scheffer Proposal (Article 8bis) 
Regarding new Article 8bis, the Scheffer proposal omits any effort 
to enumerate all possible acts that could constitute an “act of aggression” as 
the SWGCA seeks to do in its Article 8bis(2)32 with incorporation of the 
wording of GA Resolution 3314.33  Instead, it proposes a definition of the 
crime of aggression that avoids reference to an “act of aggression” because 
the Security Council and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have not in 
the past, and would not in the future, consider themselves bound to GA 
Resolution 331434 when determining the existence of an act of aggression.  
Proponents of the Scheffer proposal felt that the ICC should likewise not 
consider itself bound to GA Resolution 331435 when adjudicating the crime 
30 Rome Statute, supra note 17. 
31 See Article 8 bis, supra note 5. See infra Part III. A. 
32 Article 8 bis, supra note 5 at 2.  
33 See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 1. 
34 Id.
35 Id.
2009] EXPERTS MEETING REPORT 441
of aggression against an individual (or an act of aggression if given the 
chance under Scheffer Option 1).  However, the proposal does provide that 
the elements of the crime of aggression (when drafted) should draw (but not 
exclusively) upon the acts listed in Article 3 of GA Resolution 3314.36  This 
keeps GA Resolution 3314 “in the game” but in a far more realistic and 
practical manner than as currently drafted by the SWGCA. 
The Scheffer proposed definition of the crime of aggression (Article 
8bis(1)), narrows the crime (for purposes of individual criminal responsi-
bility) to military interventions of a specific character, with caveats that 
reflect the reality of Security Council authorizations, the Uniting for Peace 
option,37 and Article 5138 exercises of the right of individual or collective 
self-defense.  Note, however, that in coming to Article 15bis in the propos-
al, the Security Council, General Assembly, ICC, or ICJ (depending on 
what option is used), can override a State’s initial invocation of Article 5139
and determine that an act of aggression has occurred despite the State’s plea 
of self-defense.  This would launch the ICC into individual criminal accoun-
tability. The proposal incorporates much of what the SWGCA draft includes 
but also focuses on Article 2(4) of the Charter40 as an alternative to the 
broader and far more indeterminate (for criminal purposes) scope of  “the 
Charter of the United Nations.” 
New Article 8bis of the Rome Statute 
Crime of Aggression 
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position ef-
fectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action 
(in whole or substantial part) of a State, of an unlawful military intervention 
by one State into the territory (land, sea, or air) of another State of such cha-
racter, gravity, and scale that it constitutes a manifest violation of the prohi-
bition on the use of force under article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, 
36 See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Supra note 1 art 3. 
37 G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Nov. 3, 1950). 
38 U.N. Charter art. 51. (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the Unit-
ed Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any 
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”) 
39 Id.
40 U.N. Charter art. 2, para 4. 
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provided that the lawful deployment or use of armed force undertaken pur-
suant to Security Council authorization, United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 377(V) of 3 November 1950, or Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter shall be excluded from such definition. 
2. The elements of the crime of aggression shall draw, inter alia, 
from Articles 2 and 3 of United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 
(XXIX) of 14 December 1974 to establish the character of an act of aggres-
sion for purposes of criminal responsibility under this Statute. 
The Scheffer Proposal (Article 15bis) 
Regarding the Article 15bis jurisdictional filter, there are two op-
tions presented under this proposal.  Both options mirror SWGCA Article 
15bis, Sections 1 and 2.41  Both options also use identical language for Sec-
tion 3(a), which invokes Alternative 1, Option 2 (green light) of the 
SWGCA Article 15bis42 (with a clarification regarding the crime of aggres-
sion) as the first of two jurisdictional filters available under Section 3.  Both 
Scheffer options then propose new language for sub-section (b) of Section 
3. 
41 Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Discussion Paper on the Crime of Aggression Proposed by 
the Chairman, ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/2 (2 June 2008), Article 8 bis [hereinafter Article 8 bis], 
available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/2AE911B2-15AA-4276-8F23-5D6818907 
007/146570/ICCASP6SWGCA2English1.pdf. (“Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression 1. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance 
with article 13, subject to the provisions of this article. 2. Where the Prosecutor concludes 
that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime of ag-
gression, he or she shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determina-
tion of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned. The Prosecutor shall notify 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the situation before the Court, including any 
relevant information and documents. Alternative 1: 3. In the absence of such a determination, 
the Prosecutor may not proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, 
Option 1 – end the paragraph here. Option 2 – add: unless the Security Council has, in a 
resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, requested the 
Prosecutor to proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression. Alternative 
2: 4. Where no such determination is made within [6] months after the date of notification, 
the Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, Option
1 – end the paragraph here. Option 2 – add: provided that the Pre-Trial Chamber has autho-
rized the commencement of the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression in accor-
dance with the procedure contained in article 15; Option 3 – add: provided that the General 
Assembly has determined that an act of aggression has been committed by the State referred 
to in article 8 bis; (Option 4 – add:) provided that the International Court of Justice has de-
termined that an act of aggression has been committed by the State referred to in article 8 bis. 
5. This article is without prejudice to the provisions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction 
with respect to other crimes referred to in article 5. 4. Insert the following text after article 
25, paragraph 3, of the Statute: 3 bis In respect of the crime of aggression, the provisions of 
this article shall apply only to persons in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of a State.”).
42 Id. 
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In Scheffer Option 1 (judicial green light), Article 15bis(3)(b) 
would require a Security Council Chapter VII resolution43 determining a 
breach of the peace resulting from the use of armed force (and lacking any 
conditionality prohibiting Court interference) which then triggers a judicial 
option for the ICC or the ICJ to determine whether an act of aggression has 
occurred. (Both judicial options are bracketed to invite consideration 
whether the SWGCA wants to resort only to the ICC, only to the ICJ, or an 
option for either.)  Scheffer Option 1 invites a judicial consideration pro-
vided the Security Council has not prohibited it by the terms of the Chapter 
VII resolution.44 Such a prohibition could arise, for example, if it is simply a 
follow-on sanctions resolution and the Council wants nothing to do with the 
ICC at that stage. 
Scheffer Option 2 (soft green light) offers an Article 15bis(3)(b) 
that retains more control with the Security Council by requiring that the 
Security Council first must refer a breach of the peace situation to the ICC 
Prosecutor who then can launch investigations only if the General Assembly 
has adopted a resolution determining that an act of aggression has occurred 
or the ICJ has delivered a judgment or an advisory opinion ruling that an act 
of aggression has occurred.  Scheffer Option 2 thus addresses the situation 
where the Security Council is interested in an ICC investigation but is un-
willing to make the call on an act of aggression itself. In such a case the 
Security Council is willing to pass the buck to the General Assembly or the 
ICJ by referring the breach of peace to the Prosecutor. 
It is likely that the straightforward SWGCA green light jurisdiction-
al procedure,45 coupled with an opt-in procedure for the crime of aggression 
(see discussion in part IV below), would be the preferred formula for the 
Perm 5 and some others. The aim of this proposal is to present two addi-
tional options that may be necessary to bridge the gap between the P-5 and 
so many other governments, the latter of which are seeking some alternative 
to an exclusive Security Council filter.  The proposal also seeks to clean up 
the definition of the crime of aggression and leave judgments about an act 
of aggression to the political organs and, when necessary, to the designated 
courts, none of which will be bound by GA Resolution 331446.
43 U.N. Charter arts. 39-51. 
44 Id.
45 See Article 15 bis, supra note 41. 
46 See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 1.
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Option 1 (judicial green light) 
New Article 15bis of the Rome Statute 
Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
1. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggres-
sion in accordance with article 13, subject to the provisions of this article. 
2. Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis 
to proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, he or 
she shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determina-
tion of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned.  The Prose-
cutor shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the situa-
tion before the Court, including any relevant information and documents. 
3. In the absence of such a determination, the Prosecutor may not 
proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression unless  
a. the Security Council has, in a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, requested the Prosecutor to pro-
ceed with the investigation in respect of an act of aggression committed by 
the State concerned and any crime of aggression that arises thereunder, or  
b. the Security Council has, in a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations and which lacks any conditionality 
regarding the Court, determined the existence of a breach of the peace as the 
result of the use of armed force between States and thereafter, with respect 
to that situation, [the Pre-Trial Chamber has determined at the request of the 
Prosecutor, a State Party, or the Security Council that an act of aggression 
has been committed by the State concerned] [or] [the International Court of 
Justice has delivered a judgment in a contentious case or an advisory opi-
nion, pursuant to the request of the General Assembly or the Security Coun-
cil, which determines that an act of aggression has been committed by the 
State concerned]. 
4. This article is without prejudice to the provisions relating to the 
exercise of jurisdiction with respect to other crimes referred to in Article 5. 
Option II (“soft green light”) 
New Article 15bis of the Rome Statute 
Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
1. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggres-
sion in accordance with article 13, subject to the provisions of this article. 
2. Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis 
to proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, he or 
she shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determina-
tion of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned.  The Prose-
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cutor shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the situa-
tion before the Court, including any relevant information and documents. 
3. In the absence of such a determination, the Prosecutor may not 
proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression unless  
a. the Security Council has, in a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, requested the Prosecutor to pro-
ceed with the investigation in respect of an act of aggression committed by 
the State concerned and any crime of aggression that arises thereunder, or  
b. the Security Council has, in a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, referred to the Prosecutor a situa-
tion regarding the existence of a breach of the peace as a result of the use of 
armed force between States but about which the Security Council has not 
determined that an act of aggression has occurred, and provided thereafter 
that the General Assembly has determined by resolution or the International 
Court of Justice has delivered a judgment in a contentious case or an advi-
sory opinion, pursuant to the request of the General Assembly or the Securi-
ty Council, determining that an act of aggression has been committed by the 
State concerned in respect of such situation. 
4. This article is without prejudice to the provisions relating to the 
exercise of jurisdiction with respect to other crimes referred to in Article 5. 
For both options, add a subsection 3bis after Art. 25(3): 
3bis
In respect of the crime of aggression, the provisions of this article 
shall apply only to persons in a position effectively to exercise control over 
or to direct the political or military action (in whole or substantial part) of a 
State.
Discussion Points on Jurisdictional Proposals 
An expert pointed out several issues to discuss: (a) whether the 
green light option (alternative 1, option 2) can be useful as a basis for a 
compromise later; (b) whether the Scheffer proposal, alternative 1, option 3, 
could be a useful basis for a compromise; and (c) whether it would be useful 
to have a determination of an act of aggression before an indictment is re-
quested against a leader.   
Limitations of the Scheffer Proposal Regarding Prosecutors 
One expert cautioned against hindering a prosecutor’s investigation, 
emphasizing that one of the important weapons the prosecutor should have 
is the possibility of informing the public about the facts of an alleged act of 
aggression.  The expert noted that if the Security Council fails to act, the 
prosecutor would not be able to make any statement or investigation.  The 
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prosecutor’s only recourse in this situation will be to present the facts 
against the defendant to the public. According to this proposal, the prosecu-
tor could indict for crimes against humanity and war crimes, but with regard 
to the crime of aggression, he could do nothing. This proposal limits the 
prosecutor by saying that the prosecutor may not indict, may not commence 
a proceeding, and may not convict unless one of the three organs has agreed 
that he may do so. This paralyses the prosecutor which is not good for long-
term goals. The expert asserted that a proposal that puts another barrier in 
front of the prosecutor is not constructive.   
One expert introduced the Republic of Georgia as an analogy of 
what the prosecutor has done with the traditional crimes.  In this case, the 
prosecutor expressed concern with the situation and reported that his office 
was considering an investigation. Similarly, in the Ivory Coast, the prosecu-
tor also opened an investigation but the prosecutor was never able to public-
ly report his findings before the presentation of facts to the ICC, as it would 
have been inappropriate for the prosecutor to do so. The expert asserted that 
the proposal does not change this aspect for prosecutors.  The expert em-
phasized that prosecutors should at least be able to investigate because the 
Security Council will not likely take action. The expert stated that when 
prosecutors had a situation under review as opposed to investigation, the 
media knew that the prosecutor was looking into the situation and knew 
where the prosecutor visited, but the prosecutor was not quoted in the press.  
One expert asserted that the public has an essential right to know.  
As such, it is important for the prosecutor to be able to generate public sup-
port based on the reaction or lack of reaction by the Security Council. An 
expert pointed out that while the prosecutors have been transparent, they 
have not gone beyond stating that the issue is under review. The expert 
wants to encourage transparency to a greater degree so that the prosecutor 
can leverage public pressure to proceed with investigations into state acts of 
aggression, as he does in connection with crimes against humani-
ty. Showing the public the egregious nature of the aggressor will help to 
discourage the adulation of the war ethic and affirm that war making itself is 
a terrible crime.   
Nomenclature of the Alternatives 
An expert pointed out that since alternative 1 and alternative 2 are 
proper alternatives, the correct way to observe this is to call them both alte-
rations to the paragraph, rather than paragraph 3 and paragraph 4.   
Red Light Solution 
One expert noted that a proposal considered at the last session of 
the SWGCA was a permanent red light solution.  The expert elaborated that 
the red light proposal is a suggestion to make the idea of independence of 
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the ICC more amenable to those countries that want strong Security Council 
involvement.  It gives the Security Council a tool to stop an ICC prosecu-
tion that is stronger than the tool in Article 16.47 If the Security Council 
makes a substantive determination that an action was not an act of aggres-
sion, for example, confirming that a State acted in self-defense, that deter-
mination would bind the ICC. The ICC would have to stop the investigation 
altogether, as opposed to suspending it for a determined length of time.  
This proposal could serve as an additional negotiating option offered to 
those delegations that favor strong Security Council involvement.  Under 
this scenario, the Security Council as a whole could, where appropriate, 
protect States from prosecution for aggression.   
Prosecutorial Procedure
One expert questioned if going to the ICC as a preliminary matter 
meant going to the pretrial chamber, trial chamber, or the appellate cham-
ber.  If it would be an adversary proceeding, the expert inquired who the 
adversaries would be, and who would argue that there is an act of aggres-
sion.  Another expert responded that the assumption is that the prosecutor 
brings the matter, suggesting that the pretrial chamber should be the first 
venue for considering the matter.  The expert pointed out that this gives rise 
to difficult questions regarding the subject of representation.   
Alternative 2, Option 3 and the Uniting for Peace Process  
One expert questioned whether the drafters of alternative 2 envi-
sioned it to be parallel to the Uniting for Peace process48 or whether alterna-
tive 2 was to have a broader role for the General Assembly.  The expert 
elaborated that in the Uniting for Peace process,49 step one requires that the 
Security Council must not be able to act because of the veto, and step two 
requires a super majority vote of the General Assembly.  The expert sug-
gested the use of force authorization as a parallel model and that the General 
Assembly vote on aggression should also require a super majority to trigger 
the jurisdiction of the ICC.   
47 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 16, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjourn 
al/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf. (“Deferral of investigation or prosecution-No investiga-
tion or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 
12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed 
by the Council under the same conditions.”). 
48 See  G.A. Res. 377(V), supra note 37. 
49 Id. 
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The expert also stressed the important point that the Securi-
ty Council has primary but not exclusive responsibility for making peace 
and security, thereby warranting a General Assembly option for determining 
aggression.    
Exclusive Role of the Security Council and the 121 Discussion 
The experts mentioned that this part of the negotiations is subject to 
political considerations more than legal theory.  One expert questioned why 
there is opposition to the role of the Security Council, which is in alternative 
1, option 1, and whether these objections may apply to the Scheffer propos-
al as well.  The expert also inquired whether this consideration is tied to a 
121 discussion on entry into force.50
Additionally, another expert noted that there is opposition to an ex-
clusive role of the Security Council because of a belief that it would under-
mine the independence of the ICC; therefore, any option must make clear 
that it does not require that a Security Council determination that there has 
been an act of aggression bind the ICC. 
Independence of the ICC 
There was concern over the independence of the ICC, as a purely 
legal issue as opposed to a political one, and the power or role of the Securi-
50 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 121, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjourna 
l/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf. (“Amendments 1. After the expiry of seven years from the 
entry into force of this Statute, any State Party may propose amendments thereto. The text of 
any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties. 2. No sooner than three months from the 
date of notification, the Assembly of States Parties, at its next meeting, shall, by a majority of 
those present and voting, decide whether to take up the proposal. The Assembly may deal 
with the proposal directly or convene a Review Conference if the issue involved so warrants. 
3. The adoption of an amendment at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a Re-
view Conference on which consensus cannot be reached shall require a two-thirds majority 
of States Parties. 4. Except as provided in paragraph 5, an amendment shall enter into force 
for all States Parties one year after instruments of ratification or acceptance have been depo-
sited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations by seven-eighths of them. 5. Any 
amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those States Par-
ties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of 
ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, 
the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment 
when committed by that State Party's nationals or on its territory. 6. If an amendment has 
been accepted by seven-eighths of States Parties in accordance with paragraph 4, any State 
Party which has not accepted the amendment may withdraw from this Statute with imme-
diate effect, notwithstanding article 127, paragraph 1, but subject to article 127, paragraph 2, 
by giving notice no later than one year after the entry into force of such amendment. 7. The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall circulate to all States Parties any amendment 
adopted at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a Review Conference.”). 
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ty Council in the determination process.  One expert asserted that the Schef-
fer proposal can better deal with an objection on the independence of the 
ICC, pointing out that States’ parties generally agree that there should be a 
jurisdiction-triggering determination and that the Security Council should 
have the first opportunity to make that determination. The expert noted that 
the Scheffer proposal does not require that the Security Council make a 
specific substantive determination that aggression has occurred. 
One component of the independence argument is that the ICC has to 
be independent in terms of process, which also means that the ICC should 
be able to receive cases from States and from the prosecutor independent of 
the Security Council determination.  It is a more procedural point of the 
independence of the ICC than a substantive one.  One expert pointed out 
that the resistance to the Security Council as a trigger is not a general objec-
tion to the veto but is an objection to the fact that the Security Council has 
never made a determination of aggression and is unlikely ever to do so, the-
reby rendering the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression meaning-
less. 
Trigger Defined as a Threat to the Peace 
If the initial trigger for an investigation into aggression is a deter-
mination of a threat to the peace, then a larger area of conduct may be open 
to consideration than the small subset of cases rising to the level of aggres-
sion.  An expert pointed out, however, that such a trigger could hamper the 
Security Council in exercising Chapter VII powers51 in cases of threats to 
the peace if States fear that this will automatically authorize an investigation 
through the ICC.  One expert said the unintended effect might be to encour-
age aggression.   
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Rule 61 
Proceedings and Victim Participation 
Under ICTY Rule 61,52 the tribunal can conduct a sort of mini-trial 
to preserve evidence in a case in which it appears that authorities are unlike-
51 U.N. Charter arts. 39-51. 
52 ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 61. IT/32/Rev. 41, adopted on February 
11, 1994, as amended February 28, 2008. (“Procedure in Case of Failure to Execute a War-
rant (A) If, within a reasonable time, a warrant of arrest has not been executed, and personal 
service of the indictment has consequently not been effected, the Judge who confirmed the 
indictment shall invite the Prosecutor to report on the measures taken. When the Judge is 
satisfied that: (i) the Registrar and the Prosecutor have taken all reasonable steps to secure 
the arrest of the accused, including recourse to the appropriate authorities of the State in 
whose territory or under whose jurisdiction and control the person to be served resides or 
was last known to them to be; and (ii) if the whereabouts of the accused are unknown, the 
Prosecutor and the Registrar have taken all reasonable steps to ascertain those whereabouts, 
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ly to apprehend the defendant any time soon. During the ICTY Rule 6153
proceedings, the judges reviewed the prosecutor’s investigation and con-
firmed that there was a prima facie case.  One expert suggested that judicial 
review of the prosecutor’s investigation could serve as a model for situa-
tions involving aggression where the judge is acting in advance of an actual 
trial.  Another expert discussed how Rule 6154 allows for the possibility of 
victims participating in the process but the issue remains unaddressed.  As a 
result, the ICC continues to struggle under the present inconsistency or un-
certainty in the differing role of victims at the investigatory stage at the post 
indictment stage. The expert concluded that the victim’s role at the investi-
gatory stage and the relationship to the trigger mechanism and post-trigger 
mechanism is a consequences of leaving this question open, and the impli-
cations are unknown. 
Inaction and Lack of Determination by the Security Council  
One expert suggested that the trigger mechanism is largely a politi-
cal consideration rather than a substantive legal one.  According to one ex-
pert, political considerations are one of the major concerns of the NGO 
community.  NGOs do not necessarily fear the veto power of a permanent 
member as much as the Security Council's ineffectiveness in fulfilling its 
mandate.  The expert explained that NGOs find that the proposals are gen-
including by seeking publication of advertisements pursuant to Rule 60, the Judge shall order 
that the indictment be submitted by the Prosecutor to the Trial Chamber of which the Judge 
is a member. (B) Upon obtaining such an order the Prosecutor shall submit the indictment to 
the Trial Chamber in open court, together with all the evidence that was before the Judge 
who initially confirmed the indictment. The Prosecutor may also call before the Trial Cham-
ber and examine any witness whose statement has been submitted to the confirming Judge. 
In addition, the Trial Chamber may request the Prosecutor to call any other witness whose 
statement has been submitted to the confirming Judge. (C) If the Trial Chamber is satisfied 
on that evidence, together with such additional evidence as the Prosecutor may tender, that 
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed all or any of the 
crimes charged in the indictment, it shall so determine. The Trial Chamber shall have the 
relevant parts of the indictment read out by the Prosecutor together with an account of the 
efforts to effect service referred to in paragraph (A) above. (D) The Trial Chamber shall also 
issue an international arrest warrant in respect of the accused which shall be transmitted to all 
States. Upon request by the Prosecutor or proprio motu, after having heard the Prosecutor, 
the Trial Chamber may order a State or States to adopt provisional measures to freeze the 
assets of the accused, without prejudice to the rights of third parties. (E) If the Prosecutor 
satisfies the Trial Chamber that the failure to effect personal service was due in whole or in 
part to a failure or refusal of a State to cooperate with the Tribunal in accordance with Article 
29 of the Statute, the Trial Chamber shall so certify. After consulting the Presiding Judges of 
the Chambers, the President shall notify the Security Council thereof in such manner as the 
President thinks fit.”). 
53 Id.
54 Id. 
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erally satisfactory, but wonder what will happen if the Security Council 
refuses to act to trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction over aggression. The NGOs 
felt that if the members motivation for deciding to act was political, then the 
language does not matter because those decisions will always be subject to 
the political whims of members, mainly the permanent five (P5). The expert 
said the political reality is that the Security Council is the supreme political 
body that determines whether there has been an act of aggression. NGOs 
want assurance that silence from the Security Council does not mean that 
the ICC must be equally silent.   
A possible solution to the fear of inaction by the Security Council 
would entail a combination of Article 121(5) [permitting opt out of amend-
ments]55 with language containing an alternative trigger in the case of inac-
tion or a lack of determination by the Security Council.  The expert agreed 
that the P5 are not playing a very useful role and have not made a determi-
nation on the crime of aggression in the past.  Nonetheless, it is very impor-
tant to the P5 to remain involved.  It is an implicit reference to Article 3956
that the provisions must be consistent with the charter of the United Na-
tions. An expert expressed that it is important to find out what is acceptable 
to P5 States on substance, noting that currently there is no political will to 
go that way.  Thus, the Scheffer Proposal can be extremely useful since it 
proposes action. It is necessary to challenge traditional thinking to some 
extent; Article 3957 is not the only option.  
Experts noted that large prosecutorial competence might put a 
heavy burden on the prosecutor or on the ICC to charge aggression. On the 
other hand, if the Security Council has the responsibility to find aggression, 
there is the risk that the Security Council may not find that an act constitutes 
aggression. As a result, even if it is a widely held perception that a person 
should face prosecution, the person will avoid prosecution. Without an al-
ternative, there may be the possibility, although unlikely, that the General 
Assembly and others agree that an act constitutes aggression, but the Coun-
cil is not able to pass a resolution reflecting the consensus. Nonetheless, 
there are solutions on substance that should be acceptable to the P5.  The 
expert noted it is important to keep in mind the difference in the P5 with 
regard to their status as State parties of the Rome Treaty.  Two of the per-
manent members are States parties, and three are not close to becoming 
states parties. One reason that discussions of the alternatives are not very 
productive is due to a lack of indication of interest on the part of the P5.  
55 Rome Statute, supra note 50, art 121(5). 
56 U.N. Charter, Art. 39. (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommenda-
tions, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to main-
tain or restore international peace and security.”). 
57 Id.
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Other states do not want to advocate an alternative they feel has no promise.  
Thus, the states have little incentive to compromise.    
Another expert clarified that the P5 no longer holds the position that 
the Security Council should be the exclusive trigger, but rather feels that 
there be an additional filter in light of the nature of the crime of aggression.  
The P5 feels that this filter should be the Security Council's substantive de-
termination; however, some believe the filter should be the ICJ while others 
believe that the prosecutor and the ICC are adequate without a filter.  
The Strength of the Filters 
One expert inquired whether it is good for the ICC Statute to adopt 
a strong approach to aggression.  The expert used “strong” in two ways: (a) 
that the ICC could go forward if the Council does not act; or (b) under the 
Scheffer Proposal, that the ICC go forward even if the Council merely says 
there is a threat to international peace or invokes Chapter VII.58 Some ex-
perts expressed reservations about whether a strong aggression provision 
with a weak filter is useful for the ICC.  Experts pointed out that a strong 
aggression provision could be very useful for small states that genuinely 
fear their neighbor might invade them; they might feel protection from sign-
ing the agreement.
The discussion turned to aggression by a permanent member.  The 
expert noted that the Security Council did ultimately invoke Chapter VII59
with respect to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and asked what the unintended 
consequences could be of the Scheffer Proposal. Although the resolution 
concerned the obligations of occupation and the transition to sovereignty 
rather than opining that there was an unlawful use of force, it shows that the 
Chapter VII trigger60 might be overly broad.  A weak filter could have unin-
tended consequences that could ultimately damage the ICC's ability to func-
tion well with respect to the other three crimes.   
Another expert asked what a strong filter meant. The first expert 
clarified that option 1 is the strong filter and opined with regards to alterna-
tive 1, option 2 that if the two permanent members who are states parties 
went with that option, they may be able to persuade the other members to 
accept it. One expert noted, however, that adding stronger filters may crip-
ple the ICC’s usefulness in resolving conflict.   
58 U.N. Charter arts. 39-51. 
59 Id.
60 Id.
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Legitimacy of the ICC 
Both alternatives present risks to the legitimacy of the ICC.  The 
risk in alternative 1, option 1 is that the ICC will not appear to apply the law 
equally.  The risk, on the other hand, of having a more independent court is 
that it will be ineffectual, and not having the participation of the great pow-
ers will undermine its legitimacy.  Either approach is going to have risks; 
the true task is to balance these risks in striving for compromise.  
An expert responded that it is an illusion that the ICC is indepen-
dent or should be independent.  The ICC will not be and cannot be indepen-
dent because of Article 39.61 No proposal can solve this because the big 
powersthe P5 and some otherswill prevent such a resolution. They 
have made sure that they will have control, and they have written that into 
the consensus definition, Article 16 of the Rome Statute62 and into the pro-
vision on complementarity.63
Appeasing the Security Council  
The key question is to determine what filters to includ to appease 
the Security Council. One expert explained that the Security Council has 
already put many obstacles in place and will need a compromise that can 
61 U.N. Charter, Art. 39. 
62 ICC Statute, supra note 47, art. 16.
63 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjourna 
l/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf. (“Issues of admissibility- 1. Having regard to paragraph 10 
of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) 
The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless 
the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) 
The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has 
decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwil-
lingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; (c) The person concerned has al-
ready been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is 
not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3; (d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify 
further action by the Court. 2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the 
Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by interna-
tional law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: (a) The proceedings 
were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of shielding 
the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court referred to in article 5; (b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings 
which in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice; (c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartial-
ly, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is incon-
sistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 3. In order to determine inabili-
ty in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse 
or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or 
the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.”).  
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also appeal to the rest of the members, without giving away too much. For 
example, a clause that allows no convictions under this statute unless the 
Security Council has determined that the crime of aggression by a State has 
occurred would be absolutely consistent with the U.N. Charter and with 
suggestions in Rome.  The expert asserted that the statute must contain sa-
feguards in order to protect the interest of the smaller states. The expert 
proposed that the Security Council should only act pursuant to the applica-
tion of principles of law and justice. If the accusation of aggression involves 
any member nation of the Security Council, that nation must recuse itself 
and not take part in the determination of aggression.   
The United States of America and the ICC 
One expert suggested that the ICC actually benefited from the non-
involvement of the United States. Another expert predicted that the next 
administration is not likely be any different than the last two administrations 
with respect to the ICC, stating that millions of Americans will not accept 
the idea of any foreign court ruling that an American has committed war 
crimes or that an act is aggression rather than a humanitarian intervention. 
The expert believed that once the ICC has proven itself over time, the 
Americans will sign on with the ICC, as the Major Powers did with the ICJ.  
For example, the British were very much concerned about setting up an 
international court but accepted the court once they knew it was not binding 
or compulsory.   
Interplay between the Security Council and the ICC Prosecutor  
When the Chairman of the Working Group reaches a conclusion 
that the current proposed text will not receive sufficient majority accep-
tance, the options will be to either drop the crime of aggression, which re-
pudiates Nuremberg, or work using the types of clauses discussed at the 
experts meeting as a compromise. 
Political Guidance for the ICC 
The experts noted that it is very hard to move forward without any 
signals of compromise from the P5 of the Security Council.  The Scheffer 
Proposal is very interesting and helpful, but it does not come from the Unit-
ed States of America.   
JURISDICTIONAL OPT-IN/OPT-OUT (THE MANSON PROPOSAL)
The final segment of the meeting focused on the procedure by 
which states accept the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.  
Most experts agreed it would be preferable for a state to accept jurisdiction 
through an opt-in or opt-out procedure. One expert submitted a proposal 
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that reflected the primacy of Security Council's determination of aggression 
but not its exclusivity and allowed states to opt-in to jurisdiction according-
ly.  The experts also discussed the political feasibility of the opt-in or opt-
out procedures both in the proposal and more broadly. The experts reviewed 
the need to balance the concerns of existing states parties with those of in-
fluential non-states parties, and they reviewed the various motivations for 
states to opt-in.  The experts concluded with a brief exchange regarding 
victims’ issues and if, how, and when to consider them.  
Manson’s Proposed Amendment to Article 12 
One of the experts, Robbie Manson of the U.K., circulated a pro-
posed amendment to Article 12. The proposal suggested by Mr. Manson 
aims to offer a regime for optional acceptance of the proposed new article 
15(bis) proposal. Those states who are not yet ready to proceed with respect 
to the requisite factual pre-determination being made on a basis of primary, 
as opposed to exclusive, Security Council competence, may nonetheless be 
willing to agree to such a primary competence amendment being made, 
under the Article 121(4)64 mechanism, in the sure knowledge that it will not 
apply to them unless and until they are ready to accept it by a subsequent 
unilateral declaration. The proposal would insert “Subject to paragraph 
(2)(bis) below,” at the start of article 12, paragraph (2) then continue as is. 
This text anchors the provisions of the proposed new paragraph 
(2)(bis) within the established existing text of Article 12,65 which the propo-
nent of the proposal felt to be the natural place to provide for a special “opt-
in” regime with respect to the crime of aggression. In this regard, the propo-
nent of the proposal argued that this is only an “opt-in” so far as concerns 
the preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. This differs 
from an example of the kind of “opt-in” regime already provided by Art. 
64 Rome Statute, supra note 50. 
65 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjourna 
l/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf. (“Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction 1. A State 
which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with re-
spect to the crimes referred to in article 5. 2. In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the 
Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this 
Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3: (a) The 
State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was commit-
ted on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft; (b) The 
State of which the person accused of the crime is a national. 3. If the acceptance of a State 
which is not a Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, that State may, by declara-
tion lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to 
the crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay 
or exception in accordance with Part 9.”). 
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121(5)66 which language suggests the intent is instead to deal with an opt-in 
to the jurisdiction of the court over a new crime in its entirety. This would 
cover a new crime subsequently added to the statute by amendment, which 
is not the case with aggression.  Other experts felt that Art. 121(5)67 applied 
to all amendments, including those pertaining to the crime of aggression.  
Proponents of placing the opt-in provision in Article 1268 felt that it would 
also have the advantage of immediately being an appropriate place to ex-
clude a Security Council referral (under Art. 13(b)69) from being subject to 
the provisions of such a proposed opt-in regime, since Art. 12(2)70 already 
applies only to the Art. 13(a) or (c)71 triggers (state party referral or prosecu-
tor referral proprio motu).
The two variations offered below reflect a perception of the prin-
cipal alternatives that States favor depending on their differing perspective 
as to what is politically achievable or acceptable. Alternative (a) creates a 
jurisdiction in which an accused person could potentially be captured or 
transferred to the Court for committing an act of aggression on the territory 
of a State party which has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, irrespective 
as to whether or not the person is also a national of a State which has ac-
cepted the jurisdiction (the broader jurisdiction). Whereas, alternative (b) 
creates a jurisdiction in which an accused can only be captured or trans-
ferred to the Court if his national State has accepted the jurisdiction, irres-
pective as to where in the world his act of aggression occurred (the narrower 
jurisdiction).
Insert new paragraph (2)(bis) in Article 12 as follows: 
Alternative (a) 
With respect to the crime of aggression, in the case of article 13, pa-
ragraph (a) or (c) the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only if the State, 
66 ICC Statute, supra note 50, art. 121. 
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 13, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjourna 
l/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf. (“Exercise of jurisdiction-The Court may exercise its juris-
diction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of 
this Statute if: (a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been 
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14; (b) A 
situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to 
the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations; or (c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in 
accordance with article 15.”). 
70 Rome Statute, supra note 65. 
71 Rome Statute, supra note 69. 
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mentioned in either paragraph (2)(a) or (b) above, has lodged a declaration 
with the Registrar indicating that it accepts the provisions of article 
(15)(bis). Such a declaration may be made unconditionally or on condition 
of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or in respect of a par-
ticular situation. 
Alternative (b) 
In place of the words “...either paragraph (2)(a) or (b)...” above, 
substitute simply “...paragraph 2(b)...” 
This language makes the proposed opt-in regime applicable only to 
the special conditions concerning the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression, as inserted by the proposed new Art. 15(bis), and does not 
affect any other aspect of the crime, such as the definitional aspects dealt 
with by proposed new Articles 8(bis) and 25(3)(bis), etc.  The language 
employed to describe the differing kinds of declarations originates from 
Article 36(3) of the Statute of the ICJ, 72 which, though not without critics, 
has the merit of being a long-established workable model.   
Finally, with regard to the case of the narrower jurisdiction, if it is 
considered necessary to address the asserted anomaly, which has been al-
luded to by some, as respects the position of the nationals of non-states par-
ty accused of committing aggression on the territory of a state party acced-
ing to the jurisdiction, when compared to that of nationals of states party 
who have not so acceded - then that can be achieved simply by the follow-
ing means: 
In article 12, paragraph (3) after the reference to paragraph 2 insert 
“or paragraph 2(bis)” 
Value of an Opt-In Procedure for States with Shared Borders or a History 
of Hostilities 
Those in favor of this opt-in approach felt that it would have partic-
ular value to States with a shared border or history of hostilities which in the 
future could chose to make an ICC Crime of Aggression opt-in declaration 
part of any bi-lateral peace agreement or friendship, commerce, and naviga-
tion treaty.  Such a provision would strengthen the States’ mutual security 
since each would feel secure that any act of aggression by the other party 
would subject its leaders to the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
72 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(3). (“The declarations referred to 
above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or 
certain states, or for a certain time.”).
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Interplay of Manson’s Proposed Amendment of Article 12 with Article 
15bis, Alternative 2 
The proponent of this proposal suggested this amendment would al-
low the P5, as well as, those nations who share their concerns, to find a so-
lution by way of Article 15 bis alternative 2. This alternative does not rec-
ognize exclusive Security Council predetermination but rather the primacy 
of the Security Council's determination of an act of aggression. The expert 
hoped this amendment would represent a middle ground that would appeal 
to parties who disagree as to how to address jurisdiction. 
Relation to Article 121(5) 
The proponent of this proposal suggested that the ordinary meaning 
of the language of 121(5)73 indicated that it naturally lent itself to an 
amendment regime appropriate to existing and new crimes introduced to the 
jurisdiction of the Court. He stated that the proposed amendments to the 
Statute currently under debate in the Special Working GroupArt 8(bis), 
Art. 15(bis), and Art. 25(3)(bis)are, in his opinion, amendments which 
introduce the means (definition and conditions) whereby to allow the Court 
to exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of Aggression (which is already 
within the jurisdiction), rather than to either introduce that crime or amend 
it. In other words, Art. 121(5) is there for amendment to existing core 
crimes or the introduction of new crimes; whereas, the current project is 
rather an amendment to enable exercise of jurisdiction in contrast to an 
amendment to the provisions on an existing or new crime. 
Based on this observation, the expert suggested amending Article 
12 in order to achieve the objectives laid out in the introductory comments 
to 121(5).74 The expert then suggested making proposed amendments to the 
preconditions to exercise jurisdiction over aggression with respect to pro-
prio motu investigations by the prosecutor or by state referral. An amend-
ment to Article 12(2) only applies to Articles 13(a) and (b),75 which are the 
two mechanisms that do not involve the Security Council. 
73 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 13, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjourna 
l/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf. (“Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute 
shall enter into force for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year 
after the deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party 
which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding 
a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party's nationals or on its 
territory.”). 
 74 Id.
 75 Rome Statute, supra note 69. 
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Clarification of Proposed Article 12(2)(bis) 
The chair asked for clarification of the new paragraph (2)(bis) of the 
amendment, asking when the requirement to lodge the declaration would 
arise and whether it is a declaration that is lodged for any prospective 
charge of aggression or a case-by-case declaration. 
The proponent of this proposal stated the amendment left the timing 
of the requirement open to generate debate. The amendment reflects the 
language used in Article 121,76 which indicates a permanent declaration in 
which a state has acknowledged the amendment.  The language of Article 
12(3) is similar to an ad hoc declaration, which lends itself only to recogni-
tion of jurisdiction for the purposes of a specific case. The proponent of the 
proposal expressed the view that the better language would be one which 
adopted a permanent declaration lodged with the Security Council, and that 
the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICC should be on a temporary or ad 
hoc basis. The expert also explained how Article 36 of the UN Charter,77
which makes a declaration antecedent to the jurisdiction on a reciprocal 
basis either on a case-by-case or permanent basis, influenced the flexibility 
of the language used in the amendment. 
Another expert asked whether this was an amendment to Articles 5, 
6, 7, and 8.78 The expert also questioned whether the amendment adoption 
must be pursuant to the procedure in Article 121(4)79 requiring seven-
eighths or if it is part of a package. 
The expert responded that the amendment to Article 12 can only be 
adopted under 121(4),80 and it is part of a package that will require a seven-
eighths vote.   
Possibility of an Opt-Out Procedure 
In response, another expert suggested doing the opposite; instead of 
filing a declaration to get into the jurisdiction, the default would place a 
76 Rome Statute, supra note 50. 
 77 U.N. Charter art. 36.  (“1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the 
nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate proce-
dures or methods of adjustment. 2. The Security Council should take into consideration any 
procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties. 
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into 
consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the 
International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.”). 
78 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5-8, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/off 
icialljournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf. 
79 Rome Statute, supra note 50. 
80 Id.
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nation under jurisdiction unless it files a declaration opting-out.  From a 
sociological standpoint, the advantage of this approach is that most actors 
will stay put in the situation in which they find themselves.  The result 
would be a regime that requires affirmative action to opt-out with the end 
goal of having more players in the regime than outside of it.  The expert 
noted that only 60 out of 192 nations have accepted the compulsory juris-
diction of the ICC, which has an opt-in procedure. 
Timing of Declaration 
Another expert expanded on this idea questioning the timing of a 
declaration. The experts agreed the timing for filing a declaration would 
arise at the earliest moment when the amendment passes.  Another expert 
also suggested substituting war crimes with crimes of aggression in Article 
12(4). 
Limitation of Jurisdiction to Nationals of States Who Have Accepted Juris-
diction
Concerning paragraph 2 (bis) of the proposal, an expert raised the 
notion that only a minority of States are concerned that they might become 
the target of prosecution for a crime.  Most states will show interest in this 
provision because it will protect them rather than threaten them. Amending 
the statute to say the only way to prosecute people is if they are non-
nationals might emasculate the whole concept.  The expert also expressed 
concern that paragraph 2 (bis) only deals with Article 12(2) and not 12(3) in 
which a non-states party accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
The experts agreed that the proposal excludes imposing jurisdiction 
in which a State makes an Article 12(3) declaration. 
Some experts expressed support for the proposal as it introduced the 
idea of separating the definition of aggression from accepting jurisdiction, 
as well as the idea of limiting jurisdiction to people who are nationals of 
States who have accepted jurisdiction.  Any aggressor state would have to 
accept jurisdiction for itself. This negates the preconditions in Article 
12(2)(A), and would require the national be from a State that has accepted 
jurisdiction.
Other experts felt the proposal would not work because it still does 
not resolve the issue of extending jurisdiction to non-states parties. An ex-
pert suggested adding a reference to paragraph 3(a) to include non-states 
parties.
The group generally recognized the merits of both opt-in and opt-
out procedures.  An expert questioned whether the Security Council could, 
by referral, charge a non-party with aggression. The expert asked whether 
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this would fall under Article 13(b)81 or if a non-states party could opt-in to 
jurisdiction.   
The proponent of the proposal stated that non-parties should be in 
no better or worse condition than State parties who decided not to opt-in.  
The statute as it stands is only good in offering legal protection between two 
States who have opted-in.  The experts generally recognized it as another 
leap to apply liability to nationals of a State that has not opted-in, as this 
would require the approval of the Security Council and hence the P5. 
One expert raised the point that the crucial part of the proposal was 
limiting it to nationals, as it takes away the possibility of handling non-
states actors that are acting on states parties’ territory.  Alternative 1 could 
accomplish excluding the possibility of handling non-states actors acting on 
states parties’ territory and would not subject permanent members to prose-
cutions for aggression.
An expert suggested changing the wording in paragraph 2(b) by de-
leting the words "which the person accused as a national," and inserting 
"only the State mentioned in either 2(a) or 2(b) above, has lodged a declara-
tion." If the Security Council is unable to act, then it is not a problem to 
neither opt-in nor opt-out, and then the ICC can proceed.  The expert as-
serted that the Security Council must have primacy but not exclusivity. 
Political Feasibility of Jurisdiction in the Proposal 
The experts then discussed the political side of jurisdiction.  An ex-
pert raised the point that they should not exclude a permanent declaration as 
an option, and State's might be more prone to accept jurisdiction automati-
cally from a Security Council referral.   
An expert suggested flexibility with respect to some states in order 
to make an opt-in procedure to jurisdiction more palatable.  The expert cited 
the European Union as an example of a strong regime with different obliga-
tions for different states. 
Several experts discussed why a state would ever agree to opt-in or 
refrain from opting-out. One expert used the examples of two small states 
that have a border dispute.  Each side of the border dispute would have fears 
that the other side will someday invade the other; accepting jurisdiction 
would serve as protection. Another expert suggested States possessing 
stronger views of international law, and even some Security Council mem-
bers, would be willing to accept jurisdiction if they are confident they would 
not commit aggression.  Even if a case arises against them, the Security 
Council could use Article 1682 or a red light could be added before the Secu-
rity Council could make a determination.  
81 Rome Statute, supra note 69. 
 82 Rome Statute, supra note 47. 
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Balancing the Concerns of Existing States Parties with those of Influential 
Non-States Parties 
One expert questioned whether efforts currently underway to make 
jurisdictional language more acceptable to certain states are repeating the 
process undertaken to make sections of the Rome Statute palatable to the 
same parties. Those parties ultimately chose not to join. The expert warned 
that the debate within the SWGCA should not focus on a few states’ accep-
tance that the drafters do not adequately consider the interests of other 
states. 
Another expert pointed out that, especially as the review conference 
approaches, there should be a clear effort to attract more states into the state 
party process.  Ideally, there would be universal participation. The alterna-
tive view is that the drafters can only go so far to accommodate non-states 
parties and, at some point, should nuance the documents to suit the prefe-
rences of the states parties. Some experts suggested that the best strategy 
would be to incrementally add more states parties to the statute upon obtain-
ing their acceptance. 
Another expert suggested that crafting acceptable language to states 
like the U.S. has value beyond influencing the U.S. to sign on because it 
could also reduce hostility toward the ICC. The expert noted that during the 
Rome Conference, many states expressed frustration with the U.S. positions 
and suggested that current negotiations should not give U.S. views weight; 
however, such an approach will not help the ICC.  The U.S. delegation con-
tributed significantly at Rome. The expert asserted that it would be valuable 
for the U.S. to come in as an observer and to participate in working group 
sessions, as it has the right to do. Greater involvement should lead to more 
support and reduce the risk of a veto.
There was general agreement with both ideals: attracting more 
states parties and attracting greater engagement by the U.S. The wish is not 
to exclude or antagonize the U.S., but the drafters should not emphasize the 
considerations of the U.S. to the exclusion of those of existing states parties. 
States’ Motivations for Opting In 
One expert questioned the motivation for states to opt-in. To gain 
reciprocity with other states, some states that would not use aggression of-
ten opt-in to jurisdictional provisions; however, that is not necessarily the 
situation here.  The expert asked what reasons, presented to state leaders, 
would convince them to sign onto the jurisdiction of the ICC regarding the 
crime of aggression.  The expert pointed out that there is the possibility that 
only 30 or 40 states will opt-in.  The ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction has only 
about 60 parties.  
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Several experts reflected on this question, agreeing that, at least in 
Washington, it is much easier to make the case for opting-out of a treaty 
obligation than it is for opting-in. 
The experts noted from the surge of ratifications of human rights 
treaties that newly independent states and African states view opting in as a 
test of their legitimacy.  The Rome Statute and the crime of aggression may 
require a different leap, although some states may find opting-in to the ju-
risdiction of the crime of aggression attractive for the same reason. 
Ultimately, if the second amendment comes out whereby states get 
protection from aggressors, more states will see signing-on as attractive.  
Politically, though, that may be harder to sell to some parties.
Further, some experts stated that if the Rome Statute fails to include 
the crime of aggression, it would have negative expressive function. 
Complexity of Victims Issues 
There was wide agreement among the experts that victim issues 
could eventually enter more fully into the thinking about the crime of ag-
gression and how to prosecute the crime of aggression; however, this would 
be an extremely complicated task. 
The expert pointed out that victim issues have evolved in recent 
years enveloping a broader approach that includes jurisdiction, equity, pay-
ment, victim identification, and other issues. Victim issues from the Holo-
caust have lasted fifty years. This issue is far more complicated than origi-
nally recognized. Victim issues have not been prominent in the working 
group, and this is potentially a whole new dimension. 
One expert pointed out that the ICC's movement seems to be ex-
panding the role of victims, which could be problematic. Another suggested 
that though the drafters are not ready to bring victim issues into the special 
working group, if the crime of aggression goes through in the review confe-
rence, there could be a resolution that anticipates looking at procedures that 
might include some victim issues.  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Considering that the United Nations’ work on this topic began in 
1950, it is evident that the time has come to reach a conclusion to these ef-
forts.  For all these reasons we recommend the adoption of a definition of 
aggression, a triggering mechanism, and their submission to the 2010 Re-
view Conference, so that they may be made part of the ICC Statute.     
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ANNEX 1: THE CLEVELAND DECLARATION
The participants83 of the September 25-26, 2008 Conference and 
Experts meeting assessing the progress made by the ICC Assembly of State 
Parties in completing a definition of aggression and a triggering mechanism 
to be submitted to the 2010 Review Conference, hereby adopt the following 
declaration to be forwarded to the Assembly of State Parties: 
1. It is well-established that world peace and security, particularly in the 
era of globalized interdependence, require observance of and respect for 
the Rule of Law and the protection of human rights. No international crime 
more than aggression produces consequences that negatively impact on the 
values and interests mentioned above. This was first recognized after 
World War I and then established in the Nuremberg Tribunal Charter and 
Control Council Law No. 10 and the Tokyo Tribunal Statute following 
World War II. The international community then prosecuted at Nurem-
berg, Tokyo and elsewhere persons charged with the commission of 
“crimes against peace.” Many were found guilty and sentenced to execu-
tion or imprisonment. 
2. The United Nations Charter enshrined the prohibition of the use of 
force in its Preamble, Article 2(4), and the provisions of Chapter VII en-
trusting the Security Council with the protection, preservation and main-
tenance of world peace and security, 
3. The General Assembly in 1974 adopted by consensus Resolution 3314 
defining aggression, but efforts by the United Nations since the end of 
World War II to develop a Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security 
of Mankind were frustrated by the Cold War and realpolitik.
4. The establishment of the ICC ushered in a new era where international 
crimes such as aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes are to be prosecuted by national legal systems, and whenever this 
proves not to be feasible, by the ICC itself.  Jurisdiction over these crimes 
has been enshrined in the ICC Statute, save for aggression, pending its de-
finition and the establishment of a triggering mechanism that is consonant 
with the prerogatives of the Security Council as established by the U.N. 
Charter.  Work on a definition of aggression and a triggering mechanism 
has been undertaken for fourteen years, by the General Assembly Ad Hoc 
Committee in 1995, the General Assembly Preparatory Committee (1996-
1998), the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference, the Commission estab-
lished by the Diplomatic Conference (1998-2000), and the Special Work-
ing Group on Aggression of the Assembly of State Parties (2001-2008). 
5. We do not ignore the difficulties of state interests and the disputes in 
judgments on what constitutes aggression.  This is further complicated in 
an era of new conflicts which are quite different from classic warfare be-
83 The participating government and international organization representatives 
refrained from endorsing the Declaration.
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tween regularly constituted armies. These factors, and others, have a bear-
ing on defining aggression and on jurisdictional triggering mechanisms 
which have to take into account the prerogatives of the Security Council, 
and also those of the General Assembly and the International Court of Jus-
tice.  Moreover, we are not unmindful of issues pertaining to individual 
criminal responsibility for an international crime that involves state policy 
and state action.  But we are also mindful of the legal and symbolic signi-
ficance of the inclusion of aggression in the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
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